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Abstract
Redemption laws give mortgagors the right to redeem their property following
default for a statutorily set period of time. This paper develops a theory that explains these laws as a means of protecting landowners against the loss of nontransferable values associated with their land. A longer redemption period reduces the
risk that this value will be lost but also increases the likelihood of default. The optimal redemption period balances these effects. Empirical analysis of cross-state
data from the early twentieth century suggests that these factors, in combination
with political considerations, explain the existence and length of redemption laws.
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An Economic Theory of Mortgage Redemption Laws

I.

Introduction
Mortgage redemption laws, which grant a defaulting mortgagor a grace period to

redeem the mortgaged property, are as ancient as the mortgage itself. For example, it is
decreed in Leviticus 25:29-30 that:
If a man sells a house in a walled city, he retains the right of redemption
a full year after its sale. During that time he may redeem it. If it is not redeemed
before a full year has passed, the house in the walled city shall belong
permanently to the buyer and his descendants. It is not to be returned in the
Jubilee. But houses in villages without walls around them are to be considered
as open country. They can be redeemed, and they are to be returned in the
Jubilee.1

Mortgage laws in the United States also have a long history that “bears the scars
of the never-ending struggle between debtor and creditor” (Friedman, 1985: 246). While
strong laws protecting creditors help both creditors and debtors by ensuring the flow of
credit and promoting development, debtors invariably look to courts and legislatures for
relief during economic downturns. Thus, the common law concept of “equity of
redemption” emerged early on in English law to allow mortgagors to redeem their
property following default up to a foreclosure date set by the court. And, beginning in
1820, state legislatures in the U.S. began to pass laws that extended the redemption
period beyond foreclosure (Skilton, 1943; Friedman, 1985: 247).
1

This citation is due to Capone (1996). In fact, the whole chapter 25 of Leviticus concerns redemption.
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In spite of the enduring presence of mortgage redemption laws, economists have
devoted relatively little attention to explaining their function. Exceptions include Alston
(1984), who studied the causes and effects of mortgage foreclosure moratoria (temporary
relief from foreclosure) enacted during the Great Depression; Jaffe and Sharp (1996),
who discussed foreclosure moratoria as an efficient legislative response to unforeseen
economic downturns, given the incompleteness of mortgage contracts; Hynes, Malani,
and Posner (2003), who examined the related issue of laws exempting property from
bankruptcy proceedings; and Fisher (2006) and Fisher and Yavas (forthcoming), who
examine equitable redemption.2
In this paper, we extend this literature by developing a theoretical model of
mortgage redemption that is based on the divergence between the market valuation of
land and the value placed on it by the mortgagor. Specifically, the theory hypothesizes
the existence of a non-transferable component of mortgaged land that may arise when a
mortgagor invests time and effort in learning how to best use his land, or in simply
occupying it (so-called subjective value). In the event that the mortgagor defaults on his
mortgage, this value is lost because it is not capitalized by the market. A right of
redemption reduces the risk of this loss by effectively extending the term of the
mortgage. While such an extension strengthens the mortgagor’s incentive to make
investments in non-transferable capital, it also has the effect of lessening his incentive to
avoid default in the first place. The desirability and optimal length of a redemption period
turns on this trade-off.

2

Also see Kau and Keenan (1995), who survey the related literature on option-theoretic pricing of
mortgages and default.
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To provide a context for the theory, Section II briefly examines the history of
redemption laws in the United States. Following the theoretical analysis in Section III,
Section IV offers some empirical evidence in support of the theory using cross-state data
from the early twentieth century. Our empirical work contributes to the growing body of
literature that seeks to understand the economic forces driving variations in state laws.3

II. The Origins and History of State Mortgage Redemption Laws
To provide some background for our analysis, we begin with a brief history of
mortgage redemption laws in the United States. 4 In its modern form, equity of
redemption first appeared in 16th Century English Law, when courts began to allow
mortgagors to repay lenders after passage of the maturity date and thus reclaim
possession of land. Gradually, the law developed into a system of equitable redemption
coupled with strict foreclosure, under which foreclosure was initiated by petition from the
mortgagee to extinguish the mortgagor’s redemption rights. Upon petitioning, the court
would fix a time period during which the mortgagor could redeem the land. After this
time period had elapsed, the mortgagor’s interest was terminated and the mortgagee
would assume full possession of the land.
The chief drawback of the system was the substantial foreclosure costs inflicted
on mortgagees due to the costliness of petitioning the court for a decree of foreclosure.
The only way to extinguish the mortgagor’s redemption right other than by petition was
for the mortgagee to wait 20 years, at which point the mortgagor’s interest was ended by
prescription. Skilton (1943) conjectures that these shortcomings in the English
3

See, for example, Baker and Miceli (2000), Baker, Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull (2001, 2002), and
Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002).
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foreclosure system may have contributed to the apparent diversity in American
foreclosure and redemption laws by encouraging experimentation with other systems.
Early on, most U. S. States relied upon foreclosure by public sale, an innovation
from the English law that remains the predominant method of foreclosure in the United
States. In those states where redemption is practiced, the redemption period is usually,
but not always, terminated by sale of the land.5
Since 1820, many states have at one time or another experimented with
statutorily-imposed redemption laws that extend the mortgagor’s right of redemption
beyond foreclosure. (In some cases, the mortgagor is allowed to remain in possession of
the property during this period.) Changes in redemption laws have moved in accordance
with broad trends. Table 1, constructed from information in Jones (1882, 1904, 1928),
Skilton (1943), and Mortgage Bankers Association (1997), contains historical and current
information on state redemption laws where available.6
Historically, redemption laws have almost always been about protecting farmers
from economic downturns that placed them under considerable economic duress. For
example, Skilton (1943, p. 326) detects a small bulge in redemption legislation in the
1820’s due to the economic depression following the cessation of the Napoleonic wars.
As Table 1 shows, in the early 1820’s New York (in 1820), Tennessee (in 1821), Illinois
(in 1825), Maine (in 1821), and Missouri (in 1821) all enacted legislation allowing a
redemption period. A similar clustering of changes occurred in the 1890’s, another period

4

Much of this review of the early history of mortgage redemption relies on Skilton (1943).
Skilton (1943, page 319) writes that “Strict foreclosure has survived today as the usual remedy in only
two states: Connecticut and Vermont, where English traditions are especially strong.” His source for this
observation is Hanna (1932). Mortgage Bankers Association (1997) verifies that this remains true today.
6
See also Prather (1957) and Bridewell (1938), who provide some additional detail, but which essentially
contain information similar to Skilton (1943).
5
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of economic difficulty, when Calfornia (in 1897), Idaho (in 1895), and Oregon (in 1895)
all extended their statutes.
The trend over the past sixty years or so, however, has been for states to shorten
their redemption periods or to eliminate them entirely.7 In 1938, at the height of the
Depression, 28 of 48 states in the sample had redemption laws (Bridewell, 1938), but by
1992 only 17 had redemption laws (Mortgage Bankers Assoc., 1997). Further, of those
17 states retaining their redemption laws, 14 had shortened the redemption period.8 This
broad trend is not surprising, given the conjectured link between redemption and
agriculture, coupled with the rather dramatic decrease in the importance of agriculture in
the national economy over this time. However, it is interesting to note that the South,
historically a heavily agricultural region, did not generally employ redemption statutes.
As our empirical analysis will suggest, this may have been because agriculture in the
South was not as heavily dependent on investment in improvements as in other parts of
the country.
In spite of the time trend and the fluctuations in the nature of redemption laws
over time, they have in fact remained remarkably stable over time. Comparison of the
survey of redemption laws in various editions of Jones (1882, 1904, 1928) with Skilton
(1943) reveals that there was almost no change in mortgage redemption laws across states
over the period 1882-1943.9

7

Of course, this does not preclude future passage of foreclosure moratoria, which temporarily suspend
foreclosure in times of hardship (Skilton, 1943).
8
Though he does not offer evidence to support his claim, Bauer (1985) reports that redemption laws were
in general use from 1820 to 1920, at which point they began to disappear, in part due to the efforts of legal
scholars.
9
This is even more interesting considering the findings of Alston (1984) on the response of state
legislatures to the economic distress of farmers during the great depression through the passage of
mortgage moratorium legislation. On the other hand, the national economy remained heavily agricultural
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III.

The Model
Previous economic analyses of mortgage redemption laws have not provided a

firm theoretical basis for their pervasiveness. Most authors have seen them as a product
of the political interplay between creditors and debtors.10 While not denying the
importance of these public choice factors, in this section we develop a theory that
justifies redemption laws based on broader economic concerns.
Consider an individual (the mortgagor) who, at some point in the past, took out a
mortgage to finance the purchase of a piece of property. Suppose that a balance of B
dollars (principal plus interest) is due at time t=0, the date of maturity. There is, however,
some risk that the mortgagor will default due to random factors that affect his liquidity.
We assume, however, that he can increase his chances of paying off the loan on time by
investing in effort, e (measured in dollars), prior to the due date.11 Let p(e) be the
probability that he will not default, where p′>0 and p″<0.
Suppose that the value of the property to the mortgagor consists of two
components: a market value v and an owner-specific value s. In the case of commercial
property (including farms), v represents the present value of expected cash flows from the
property, while s represents the return from non-transferable investments, goodwill, plus
any utility benefits of ownership (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995: Chapter 5). For
residential property, v is the maximum offer that could be obtained on the market, while s

over this entire time period; in 1880, for example, the percentage of people working in the agricultural
sector was 30%, and it remained around this level in 1930. (Kuznets and Thomas, 1957).
10
This view is not new, and strong arguments against redemption laws on the grounds that they are purely
redistributive have been put forth by Prather (1957) and Bridewell (1938).
11
This could represent work effort, or any effort aimed at generating sufficient cash flow, or liquidity, to
pay off the loan on time.
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is the mortgagor’s “subjective value,” reflecting, for example, his or her attachment to the
land (Miceli and Sirmans, 1995).
We focus attention on “distressed properties,” i.e., those for which v<B, as these
are the most likely candidates for default. (For example, mortgagors with v>B could
presumably refinance their debt to avoid foreclosure.) However, we also assume that for
at least some of these distressed properties, the mortgagor’s subjective value is
sufficiently large that v+s>B, for otherwise, he would have no incentive to avoid default.
(We will see this formally below.) For simplicity, we assume that s=0 for those
properties with v+s<B.
The redemption period, if one exists, represents the period of time following
default during which the mortgagor can reclaim the property. As noted above, equitable
redemption allows the mortgagor to reclaim the property prior to the foreclosure sale by
paying off the loan balance, whereas statutory redemption extends the grace period
beyond the foreclosure sale for a set period of time. For purposes of the model, we do
not formally distinguish between these cases.12 Instead, we simply suppose that there is a
period of length T≥0, following default, during which the mortgagor can re-acquire the
property by paying off B. In effect, T is an extension of the maturity date for the
mortgage. Let q(T) be the probability, conditional on default, that the mortgagor does in
fact redeem the property during this period,13 where q′>0 and q(0)=0.14

12

We would have to distinguish between them if we included a transaction cost associated with a
foreclosure sale.
13
Unlike p, we treat q as depending only on time, though it would be straightforward to view it as a
function of mortgagor effort as well.
14
Changes in T would likely affect the cost of credit, which, strictly speaking, would affect B and probably
v. These effects, if included in the model, would simply represent an additional cost, along with that
associated with moral hazard, of raising T.
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The mortgagor takes the length of the redemption period as given and chooses
effort, e, to maximize his private expected value of the property. Since only mortgagor’s
with v+s>B will exert such effort, the relevant expected value is given by15
VM(e;T) = [p(e)+(1−p(e))q(T)](v+s−B) − e.

(1)

The optimal effort level, eM(T), therefore solves the first-order condition16
p′(1-q(T))(v+s−B) = 1.

(2)

Totally differentiating this equation yields
∂e M
p ′q ′
=
< 0.
∂T
p ′′(1 − q )

(3)

Thus, for mortgagors with v+s>B, effort is decreasing in the length of the redemption
period. This reflects a potential moral hazard problem associated with lengthening of the
redemption period and therefore provides the basis for limiting T to a finite length
(possibly zero).
From a social perspective, the function of a redemption period is to avoid the loss
of subjective value resulting from a forced sale. Thus, it is only relevant for those
properties with s>0. 17 To determine the optimal value of T, we write the expected social
value of such a property as
V(T) = v + [p(eM(T))+(1−p(eM(T)))q(T)]s − eM(T).

(4)

Note that this expression differs from (1), the mortgagor’s private value, in two ways.
First, the loan balance, B, is not present in (4) because it is simply a transfer payment; and
15

According to this specification, the mortgagor’s effort only affects the probability of default, not the
value of the property. This is purely a simplifying assumption; we would obtain the same qualitative
results if we allowed v and s to depend on e. Specifically, we would still be able to show that ∂eM/∂T<0 (as
in (3)), reflecting the moral hazard problem associated with an increasing redemption period.
16
Given v+s>B, the second order condition holds under the assumption that p″<0.
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second, (4) includes the market value of the land, v, whether or not the mortgagor
defaults, given that it is transferable. (In contrast, in (1) v is weighted by the probability
that the mortgagor retains the land.)
Taking the derivative of (4) with respect to T yields
∂V
 ∂e
= (1 − p )q ′s + [ p ′(1 − q ) s − 1] M
∂T
 ∂T


.


(5)

Using (2), we can rewrite this expression as
∂V
 ∂e 
= (1 − p )q ′s + p ′(1 − q )( B − v) M  ,
∂T
 ∂T 

(6)

which is ambiguous in sign. The first term, which is positive, represents the marginal
benefit of lengthening T. It reflects the fact that a longer redemption period increases the
chance that the mortgagor will retain the non-transferable value of the property, s.
Offsetting this is the second term, which is the marginal cost of a longer redemption
period. It captures the moral hazard effect noted above—namely, that as T is lengthened,
the mortgagor has less incentive to avoid default, which imposes a cost of B−v on the
mortgagee.18 The optimal redemption period, T*, balances these two effects at the
margin.
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that s>0 is necessary for a positive
redemption period to be optimal. It follows that redemption statutes (i.e., T*>0) should
be more prevalent in regions where landowners have invested more heavily in non-

17

Although T applies to all properties, it has no allocative effect on properties with s=0. Thus, for
purposes of determining the optimal value of T, we can focus on those for which s>0, which, by
assumption, are those properties for which v+s>B.
18
More specifically, the incentive benefit of lowering of T is due to the fact that the mortgagor underinvests
in effort from a social perspective, given that the social benefit of preventing foreclosure, s, is greater than
the private value to the mortgagor, v+s–B, under the assumption that B>v for all of the properties in
question.
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transferable capital, or where there is high subjective value associated with land
ownership. This prediction, together with the public choice factors to be discussed
below, form the basis for the empirical analysis in the next section.

IV. Empirical Analysis
The model described the fundamental tradeoff underlying redemption laws as
being between the negative impact on incentives to prevent default on one hand and
protection of owner-specific (non-marketable) land values on the other. In addition, it is
undeniable that mortgage redemption laws have historically been driven by the longstanding public commitment to protect family farms against fluctuations in the value of
agricultural land. For example, Skilton (1943, p. 329) cites the 1895 decision of the
Kansas Supreme Court in Beverly v. Barnitz:19 “…Farms valued five years ago by both
borrower and lender at $3000 or $4000, and mortgaged for $1000, are now knocked
down under the sheriff’s hammer for less than the mortgage debt, the accumulations of a
lifetime being often swept away by the shrinkage…” Further, Friedman (1985: 246) notes
that in the nineteenth century, “[l]egislatures particularly in the West, found debtor relief
politically irresistable.” Prior research in related areas has also pointed to the possible
role of the agricultural sector in influencing the nature of lending policies across states.20
In addition to economic and political factors, empirical work on the origins of
laws must take account of the force of history. It is therefore important to choose a time
period for analysis over which the issue at hand was relatively important, and for which
sufficient data are available. For this reason, we selected independent variables from
19

Beverly v. Barnitz, 55 Kan. 466, 484 (1895).
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1920, and chose as our dependent variable the state of redemption laws circa 1937 as
reported in Bridewell (1938). Since there was little change in redemption laws over the
period between 1900 and 1943, this configuration of the data positions us as close as
possible to the origins of redemption laws while remaining a recent enough time period to
admit useable data. In particular, it allows us to use data similar to that employed by
Alston (1984). In addition, this time period likely avoids most of the upheaval of the
great depression, and therefore more accurately represents the everyday state of affairs in
a given state’s economy.21
As a building block for our model, we initially consider a close relative of the
specification that Alston employed to explain variations in states’ decisions to adopt
mortgage moratoria during the Great Depression.22 His model included two variables to
capture the importance of the farm and the mortgage in a state’s economy: the percentage
of farm income in a state’s GDP, and the percentage of farms that were mortgaged.
Following Alston’s work, we include data on (1) the percentage of mortgaged farms in
1920 (taken from the 1928 Statistical Abstract of the U. S.); and (2) the percentage of the
labor force employed in the agricultural sector in 1920 (taken from Kuznets and Thomas,
1957). These variables capture the public choice forces that undoubtedly influenced the
adoption of redemption laws.
20

See, for example, Alston (1984), who finds evidence for the impact of farm interests, and Hynes, Malani,
and Posner (2003), who do not.
21
It would certainly be desirable to obtain an exact match between adoption dates displayed on table 1 and
the data, however, this is simply not feasible given available data. In fact, the quality and content of census
data dramatically improves at the beginning of the 20th century. In our favor, most of these variables
evolve relatively slowly over time and therefore more recent values might serve as useful instruments of
past values. For example, the correlations between the length of average tenure (an independent variable in
our analysis) in 1910, and length of tenure in 1920 and 1930, are, respectively, 0.92 and 0.85.
22
One possible interpretation of our model is as a longer run specification of Alston’s empirical model. He
analyzes states’ decisions to enact mortgage moratorium legislation during the early years of the Great
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We also include three additional variables to capture the importance of specific
(non-transferable) investments, as suggested by the theory. First, we include the
percentage of farm acres that were improved, taken from the 1928 Statistical Abstract of
the U. S. This reflects the degree to which land improvement was important in the state’s
agricultural sector. Additionally, we include the ratio of the value of implements and
machinery to the value of farm land and buildings. This is a further measure of how
important non-land inputs were in determining the overall value of the land. Finally, we
include a measure of the average length of tenure on the farm for each state. A longer
span of time on a farm should indicate more specific farm capital, as well as greater
attachment to the land. In 1910, the Census bureau began collecting information on the
number of farmers who had been on their farm less than a year, one year, between two
and four years, five and nine years, and more than 10 years. Using this information from
1920, we piece together an index of average farm tenure length, forming a weighted
average using the midpoints of the above intervals, where we interpret “more than 10
years” as “15 years.”
Together, the previous three variables serve as proxies for the non-transferable
component of land value. While it is inevitable that improvement of land or investment in
implements and machinery will increase the market value of land, it is also reasonable to
suppose that not all improvements will ultimately be reflected in market value in the
event that the farmer must sell the farm. Additionally, one might expect that the more
time a farmer has spent on the farm, the more likely it is that he will have acquired
specific knowledge about how best to work the land. This specific knowledge, plus the

Depression. By contrast, our analysis focuses on the economic forces leading to the adoption of redemption
laws in general.
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attachment to the land that naturally follows from occupation, are important components
of farm value that will not be reflected in markets.
Table 2 presents the means of the dependent variable (=1 if a state had a
redemption period c. 1937, =0 if not) and the above explanatory variables for the sample
as a whole and also for sub-samples grouped by region.23 Regional differences
immediately suggest some broad trends. For example, of the three regions where
agriculture was relatively important based on the percentage of labor employed on farms
(the South, North Central, and West), the South stands out as having had the smallest
percentage of states with redemption statutes (.31 compared to .92 in the North Central
and .91 in the West). This may be explained by the confluence of public choice and
investment concerns. The percentage of mortgaged farms in the South was much smaller
than in the other two regions (.26 compared to .49 and .44). In addition, farmers in the
North Central had a higher rate of improved land (.70 versus .53) and longer average
tenure (8.07 versus 6.92) compared to the South. While farmers in the West had a similar
average tenure length on their farms relative to Southern farmers, Western farmers had a
higher ratio of added investments compared to the South (.30 versus .20). In the
industrial northeast, farming was not an important activity during the sample period,
which accounts for the low incidence of redemption laws there, although Northeastern
farmers tended to have relatively long average tenure on their farms.

23

States in the New England Mid Atlantic Region: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. States in the South: Maryland, Delaware,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma. States in the North Central: Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan,
Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota. States in the West:
Montana, Idaho, Washington, Oregon, California, Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, and New
Mexico.
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Table 3 presents the results of fitting some econometric models to this data.
Models I and II are logistic models, where the dependent variable equals one if a
redemption law was present in the state in 1937, and zero otherwise. By comparing
models I and II, one gets the impression that the public choice variables, the percentage
of farm labor in the state and the percentage of farms mortgaged, explain the bulk of the
variation regarding the presence or absence of redemption laws. (This corresponds to
Alston’s (1984) findings.) However, the investment to value ratio is also statistically
significant and of the correct sign, while both the percentage of improved land in farms
and average tenure length have the correct sign, but are insignificant.
Model III applies a higher tech approach to the data by making use of variations
in the statute length. In particular, it shows the results of fitting a Heckman selection
model to the data by jointly estimating the probability that a state has a redemption law,
and, given the existence of a redemption law, the impact of each of the independent
variables on the length of the statutory period.24 This model was estimated using the
logarithms of all variables. Standard errors in this model were estimated using a robust
Huber-White estimator that allows for intra-region correlation in error terms.25 The Chisquare test statistic for independence of the selection and statute length equation is 16.16,
indicating that selection and length should not be modeled independently.
Model III reveals some interesting features of the data. Note first that some
variables appear to influence the choice of whether or not to have a rule, while others
24

A possibility that lies somewhere between the selection model and the straight logit model is to use a
specification such as an ordered logit. Fitting an ordered logit to the data generates similar results to models
presented.
25
See Baker et al. (2002) for a similar approach to estimating and studying variation in state laws. It is
interesting to note that many of the conceptual issues behind selection models were developed in the
context of law and economics, and in particular in the study of state variation in anti-discrimination
legislation. See Maddala (1982).
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seem to influence length. In this regard, the public choice variables are a bit more robust
than the specific investment variables. Tenure length, the percentage of farms mortgaged,
and the percent of agriculture in the labor force are all significant in explaining whether
or not a statute is in place, and those states with a larger percentage of improved land and
a large ratio of investment to farm value systematically have longer statutes. By and
large, these results are consistent with the predictions of the model Interestingly, the
percentage of mortgaged farms appears with a positive sign in the selection equation, but
with a negative sign in the statutory length equation. One interpretation of this result is
that those states with a high percentage of mortgaged farms desired to extend some
protection to borrowers by enacting a statute, but when determining the statute length,
these states took into account the possibly adverse impact of a longer redemption period
on the overall mortgage market, and hence limited the length of the statutory period.

V. Conclusion
This paper has developed an economic analysis of mortgage redemption laws in
the United States. The history of these laws displays both regional variation and
sensitivity to economic cycles, reflecting their role in protecting farmers from loss of
their land during periods of economic downturn. The importance of farming interests in a
given state has therefore been a significant factor in bringing about the passage of these
laws, as previous scholars have noted.
While not denying political considerations, we proposed a novel theoretical
justification for redemption laws based on the hypothesized existence of non-transferable
value associated with certain land uses that would be lost in the event of foreclosure.

15

According to this theory, the optimal redemption period balances the benefit of protecting
this value (i.e., lowering the probability that it will be lost) against the reduced incentive
of the mortgagor to avoid default. The empirical analysis, which used cross-state data
from the early twentieth century, verified the importance of both political and economic
factors in explaining the presence and length of redemption statutes.
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Table 1: State Redemption Laws in Historical Perspective
State

Redemption
Redemption
Year of Statutory Origins, with Important
period 1992
period 1937
Modifications
Alabama
12
24
1842 (24)
Arizona
None
6
1877 (6)
Arkansas
None
12
1879 (12)
California
None
None
1851 (6), 1897 (12)
Colorado
2.5
6
1861 (6)
Connecticut
None
None
Delaware
None
None
Florida
None
None
Georgia
None
None
Idaho
6
12
1864 (6), 1895 (12)
Illinois
7
12
1825 (12)
Indiana
3
12
Iowa
6
12
Kansas
12
18
Kentucky
None
12
1851 (12)
Louisiana
None
None
Maine
12
12
1821 (36), 1876*
Maryland
None
None
Massachusetts
None
None
Michigan
6
12
1827 (24), 1838 (12), 1839 (25) 1840 (12), 1846*
Minnesota
6
12
Mississippi
None
None
Missouri
None
12
1821 (30), 1824 (0) 1877 (12)
Montana
None
12
1867 (6)
Nebraska
None
9
1859 (12), 1875 (9)
Nevada
None
12
1861 (6), 1933 (12)
New Hampshire
None
None
New Jersey
None
None
New Mexico
1
9
1889 (12)
New York
None
None
1820 (12), 1837*, 1839*
North Carolina
None
None
North Dakota
6
12
1877 (12)
Ohio
None
None
Oklahoma
None
6
Oregon
None
12
1885 (4), 1895 (12)
Pennsylvania
None
None
Rhode Island
None
None
South Carolina
None
None
South Dakota
6
12
1893 (12)
Tennessee
None
24
1820 (24), 1823*, 1832*
Texas
None
None
Utah
3
6
1870 (6)
Vermont
6
12
1827 (12.25)
Virginia
None
None
Washington
None
12
1869 (6), 1886 (12)
West Virginia
None
None
Wisconsin
6
12
1849 (24), 1889 (12)
Wyoming
3
6
1869 (6)
* Denotes redemption period shortened or redemption law removed. There may be further changes in
redemption laws we were unable to document.
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Table 2: Means and means by region (Standard Deviations in Parantheses):
Variable

All States
(N=48)

Redemption law
present in 1938?

0.58
(0.50)

New
England/Mid
Atlantic
(N=9)
0.22*
(0.44)

Ratio of added
investments to
farm value (1920)

0.23
(0.09)

0.29*
(0.07)

0.16*
(0.04)

0.20
(0.03)

0.30*
(0.13)

Percentage
improved land in
farms (1920)

0.51
(0.18)

0.46
(0.16)

0.70*
(0.11)

0.53
(0.10)

0.31*
(0.15)

Average Tenure
(1920)

7.68
(1.36)

9.44*
(0.65)

8.07
(0.53)

6.92*
(1.32)

6.91*
(0.96)

Percentage farm
labor (1920)

32.5
(17.24)

10.51*
(9.16)

33.84
(13.76)

43.91*
(15.98)

29.33
(9.42)

Percentage farms
mortgaged (1920)

0.38
(0.13)

0.38
(0.08)

0.49*
(0.11)

0.26*
(0.09)

0.44*
(0.10)

*

North Central
(N=12)

South
(N=16)

West
(N=11)

0.92*
(0.28)

0.31*
(0.48)

0.91*
(0.30)

Denotes significantly different from the sample mean at the 5% level or better.
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Table 3: Fitted Models.
Independent
Variable

I

II

III
Selection
equation

Constant

-18.96**
(7.16)

-7.07**
(1.97)

-24.76**
(5.82)

Statutory
Length
equation
0.46**
(0.04)

Percent farms
mortgaged, 1920

20.28**
(6.64)

14.49**
(4.45)

7.24**
(0.73)

-0.38**
(0.04)

Percentage labor
force in
agriculture, 1920

0.13**
(.05)

0.07**
(0.03)

4.50**
(0.51)

0.28**
(0.08)

Average tenure,
1920

0.51
(0.46)

-

10.08**
(2.12)

0.63
(0.42)

Percentage of
farm land
improved, 1920

3.25
(2.75)

-

-0.15
(0.39)

0.46**
(0.04)

Ratio of
investments to
farm value, 1920

12.76*
(6.20)

-

1.07
(0.81)

0.27*
(0.11)

.44

.34

Wald Chi square,
ind. Eqns.

16.16

Pseudo R2

Notes:
1) Standard errors are in parenthesis below coefficients.
2) ** denotes significance at the 99% level; * denotes significance at the 95% level.
3) Model III was estimated by maximum likelihood using the logarithms of all variables in the
length equation. In estimating this model, a Huber-White robust estimator of standard errors
allowing for intra-region correlation of error terms was used.
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